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Abstract – Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are a set of mobile nodes which are self-configuring and connected by wireless links 
automatically as per the defined routing protocol. The absence of a central management agency or a fixed infrastructure is a key 
feature of MANETs. These nodes communicate with each other by interchange of packets, which for those nodes not in wireless 
range goes hop by hop. Due to lack of a defined central authority, securitizing the routing process becomes a challenging task 
thereby leaving MANETs vulnerable to attacks, which results in deterioration in the performance characteristics as well as raises a 
serious question mark about the reliability of such networks. In this paper we have attempted to present an overview of the routing 
protocols, the known routing attacks and the proposed countermeasures to these attacks in various works. 
——————————      —————————— 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
obile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) [1] is a set of 
mobile devices (nodes), which over a shared 
wireless medium communicate with each other 
without the presence of a predefined infrastructure or 
a central authority. The member nodes are themselves 
responsible for the creation, operation and 
maintenance of the network. Each node in the MANET 
is equipped with a wireless transmitter and receiver, 
with the aid of which it communicates with the other 
nodes in its wireless vicinity. The nodes which are not 
in wireless vicinity, communicate with each other hop 
by hop following a set of rules (routing protocol) for 
the hopping sequence to be followed.  
The chief characteristics and challenges of the 
MANETs [2] can be classified as follows: 
Cooperation: 
If the source node and destination node are out of 
range with each other then the communication 
between them takes place with the cooperation of 
other nodes such that a valid and optimum chain of 
mutually connected nodes is formed. This is known as 
multi hop communication. Hence each node is to act as 
a host as well as a router simultaneously. 
Dynamism of Topology: 
The nodes of MANET are randomly, frequently and 
unpredictably mobile within the network.[3] These 
nodes may leave or join the network at any point of 
time, thereby significantly affecting the status of trust 
among nodes and the complexity of routing. Such 
mobility entails that the topology of the network as 
well as the connectivity between the hosts is 
unpredictable. So the management of the network 
environment is a function of the participating nodes. 
Lack of fixed infrastructure: 
The absence of a fixed or central infrastructure is a key 
feature of MANETs. This eliminates the possibility to 
establish a centralized authority to control the network 
characteristics. Due to this absence of authority, 
traditional techniques of network management and 
security are scarcely applicable to MANETs. 
Resource constraints: 
MANETs are a set of mobile devices which are of low 
or limited power capacity, computational capacity, 
memory, bandwidth etc. by default. So in order to 
achieve a secure and reliable communication between 
nodes, these resource constraints make the task more 
enduring. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  A typical MANET 
Albeit the security requirements (availability, 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-
repudiation)[4] remain the same whether be it the fixed 
networks or MANETs, the MANETs are more 
susceptible to security attacks than fixed networks due 
their inherent characteristics.[5] Securitizing the 
routing process is a particular challenge due to open 
exposure of wireless channels and nodes to attackers, 
lack of central agency/infrastructure, dynamic 
topology etc.[6]. The wireless channels are accessible to 
all, whether meaningful network users or attackers 
with malicious intent. The lack of central agency 
inhibits the classical server based solutions to provide 
security. The dynamic topology entails that at any time 
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any node whether legitimate or malicious can become 
a member of the network and disrupt the cooperative 
communication environment by purposely disobeying 
the routing protocol rules. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 presents routing protocols, Section 3 presents 
the presently known routing attacks, and Section 4 
presents the various proposed countermeasures to 
these. Finally Section 5 summarizes the survey. 
 
2 ROUTING PROTOCOLS IN MANETS 
The nodes in MANETs perform the routing functions 
in addition to the inherent function of being the hosts. 
The limitation on wireless transmission range requires 
the routing in multiple hops. So the nodes depend on 
one another for transmission of packets from source 
nodes to destination nodes via the routing nodes. The 
nature of the networks places two fundamental 
requirements on the routing protocols. First, it has to 
be distributed. Secondly, since the topology changes 
are frequent, it should compute multiple, loop-free 
routes while keeping the communication overheads to 
a minimum. Based on route discovery time, MANET 
routing protocols fall into three general categories:  
a) Proactive routing protocols  
b) Reactive routing protocols 
c) Hybrid routing protocols 
2.1 PROACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS  
Proactive MANET protocols are table-driven and will 
actively determine the layout of the network. The 
complete picture of the network is maintained at every 
node, so route selection time is minimal. But the 
mobility of nodes if high then routing information in 
the routing table invalidates very quickly, resulting in 
many short lived routes. This also causes a large 
amount of traffic overhead generated when evaluating 
these unnecessary routes. For large size networks and 
the networks whose member nodes make sparse 
transmissions, most of the routing information is 
deemed redundant. Energy conservation being very 
important in MANETs, the excessive expenditure of 
energy is not desired.  
 Thus, proactive MANET protocols work best 
in networks that have low node mobility or where the 
nodes transmit data frequently. Examples of proactive 
MANET protocols include Optimized Link State 
Routing (OLSR)[7], Topology Broadcast based on 
Reverse Path Forwarding (TBRPF)[8],   Fish-eye State 
Routing (FSR)[9], Destination-Sequenced Distance 
Vector (DSDV)[10], Landmark Routing Protocol 
(LANMAR)[11], Clusterhead Gateway Switch Routing 
Protocol (CGSR)[12].  
2.2 REACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
Reactive MANET protocols only find a route to the 
destination node when there is a need to send data. 
The source node will start by transmitting route 
requests throughout the network. The sender will then 
wait for the destination node or an intermediate node 
(that has a route to the destination) to respond with a 
list of intermediate nodes between the source and 
destination. This is known as the global flood search, 
which in turn brings about a significant delay before 
the packet can be transmitted. It also requires the 
transmission of a significant amount of control traffic. 
Thus, reactive MANET protocols are most suited for 
networks with high node mobility or where the nodes 
transmit data infrequently. Examples of reactive 
MANET protocols include Ad Hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) [13], Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR) [14], Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm 
(TORA) [15], Dynamic MANET On Demand (DYMO) 
[16]. 
2.3 HYBRID ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
Since proactive and reactive routing protocols each 
work best in oppositely different scenarios, there is 
good reason to develop hybrid routing protocols, 
which use a mix of both proactive and reactive routing 
protocols. These hybrid protocols can be used to find a 
balance between the proactive and reactive protocols. 
The basic idea behind hybrid routing 
protocols is to use proactive routing mechanisms in 
some areas of the network at certain times and reactive 
routing for the rest of the network. The proactive 
operations are restricted to a small domain in order to 
reduce the control overheads and delays. The reactive 
routing protocols are used for locating nodes outside 
this domain, as this is more bandwidth-efficient in a 
constantly changing network. Examples of hybrid 
routing protocols include Core Extraction Distributed 
Ad Hoc Routing Protocol (CEDAR) [17], Zone Routing 
Protocol (ZRP) [18], and Zone Based Hierarchical Link 
State Routing Protocol (ZHLS) [19]. 
 
3 ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS 
All of the routing protocols in MANETs depend on 
active cooperation of nodes to provide routing 
between the nodes and to establish and operate the 
network. The basic assumption in such a setup is that 
all nodes are well behaving and trustworthy. Albeit in 
an event where one or more of the nodes turn 
malicious, security attacks can be launched which may 
disrupt routing operations or create a DOS (Denial of 
Service)[20] condition in the network.  
Due to dynamic, distributed infrastructure-
less nature of MANETs, and lack of centralized 
authority, the ad hoc networks are vulnerable to 
various kinds of attacks. The challenges to be faced by 
MANETs are over and above to those to be faced by 
the traditional wireless networks. The accessibility of 
the wireless channel to both the genuine user and 
attacker make the MANET susceptible to both passive 
eavesdroppers as well as active malicious attackers. 
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The limited power backup and limited computational 
capability of the individual nodes hinders the 
implementation of complex security algorithms and 
key exchange mechanisms. There is always a 
possibility of a genuine trusted node to be 
compromised by the attackers and subsequently used 
to launch attacks on the network. Node mobility 
makes the network topology dynamic forcing frequent 
networking reconfiguration which creates more 
chances for attacks. 
 The attacks on MANETs can be categorized as 
active or passive. In passive attacks the attacker does 
not send any message, but just listens to the channel. 
Passive attacks are non disruptive but are information 
seeking, which may be critical in the operation of a 
protocol.  Active attacks may either be directed to 
disrupt the normal operation of a specific node or 
target the operation of the whole network. 
 A passive attacker listens to the channel and 
packets containing secret information (e.g., IP 
addresses, location of nodes, etc.) may be stolen, which 
violates confidentiality paradigm. In a wireless 
environment it is normally impossible to detect this 
attack, as it does not produce any new traffic in the 
network. 
 The action of an active attacker includes; 
injecting packets to invalid destinations into the 
network, deleting packets, modifying the contents of 
packets, and impersonating other nodes which violates 
availability, integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation paradigm. Contrary to the passive attacks, 
active attacks can be detected and eventually avoided 
by the legitimate nodes that participate in an ad hoc 
network [21]. 
 In [22], the authors have surveyed attacks on 
MANETs and their countermeasures on protocol layer 
wise criteria. In [23], B.Kannhavong et al. have 
surveyed newer attacks like flooding, black hole, link 
withholding, link spoofing, replay, wormhole, 
colluding misrelay and their countermeasures. In [24], 
[25] the authors have presented an overview of secure 
routing protocols (Authenticated routing for ad hoc 
networks (ARAN)[26], Ariadne[27], Secure AODV 
(SAODV)[28], Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector 
routing protocol (SEAD)[29], Secure Routing Protocol 
(SRP)[30], Secure Link-State Protocol (SLSP) [31]) in 
MANETs. In this article, we will survey the current 
state of art of routing attacks and their security 
measures. 
 The first approach to develop security 
solutions is the understanding of potential threats. 
Supported by this threat analysis and capabilities of 
potential attackers, the well known routing attacks in 
MANETs are discussed. 
 
Flooding Attack:[32] 
Routing Table Overflow: 
The attacker node floods the network with bogus route 
creation packets to fake (non-existing) nodes or simply 
sends excessive route advertisements to the network. 
The purpose is to overwhelm the routing-protocol 
implementations, by creating enough routes to prevent 
new routes from being created or to overwhelm the 
protocol implementation. Proactive routing protocols, 
as they create and maintain routes to all possible 
destinations are more vulnerable to this attack. 
Sleep Depravation: 
In sleep deprivation attack, the resources of the specific 
node/nodes of the network are consumed by 
constantly keeping them engaged in routing decisions. 
The attacker node continually requests for either 
existing or non-existing destinations, forcing the 
neighboring nodes to process and forward these 
packets and therefore consume batteries and network 
bandwidth obstructing the normal operation of the 
network. 
 Impersonation Attack: 
The attacker nodes impersonates a legitimate node and 
joins the network undetectable, sends false routing 
information, masked as some other trusted node. 
Black Hole Attack: 
In this attack, the attacker node injects false route 
replies to the route requests claiming to have the 
shortest path to the destination node whose packets it 
wants to intercept. Once the fictitious route has been 
established the active route is routed through the 
attacker node. The attacker node is then in a position to 
misuse or discard any or all of the network traffic 
being routed through it. 
Node Isolation Attack [37]: 
The authors in this work have introduced an attack 
against the OLSR protocol. As implied by the name, 
the goal of this attack is to isolate a given node from 
communicating with other nodes in the network. The 
idea of this attack is that attacker(s) prevent link 
information of a specific node or a group of nodes 
from being spread to the whole network. Thus, other 
nodes who could not receive link information of these 
target nodes will not be able to build a route to these 
target nodes and hence will not be able to send data to 
these nodes. 
Routing Table Poisoning Attack: 
Different routing protocols maintain tables which hold 
information regarding routes of the network. In 
poisoning attacks, the attacker node generates and 
sends fictitious traffic, or mutates legitimate messages 
from other nodes, in order to create false entries in the 
tables of the participating nodes. Another possibility is 
to inject a RREQ packet with a high sequence number. 
This causes all other legitimate RREQ packets with 
lower sequence numbers to be deleted [33]. Routing 
table poisoning attacks can result in selection of non-
optimal routes, creation of routing loops, bottlenecks 
and even partitioning certain parts of the network. 
Wormhole Attack: 
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The wormhole attack involves the cooperation 
between two attacking nodes [34]. One attacker 
captures routing traffic at one point of the network and 
tunnels it to another point in the network that shares a 
private high speed communication link between the 
attackers, and then selectively injects tunnel traffic 
back into the network. The two colluding attacker can 
potentially distort the topology and establish routes 
under the control over the wormhole link. 
Location Disclosure Attack: 
In this attack, the privacy requirements of an ad hoc 
network are compromised. Through the use of traffic 
analysis techniques or with simpler probing and 
monitoring approaches an attacker is able to discover 
the location of a node, and the structure of the 
network.  
Rushing Attacks [35]: 
The attacker (initiator) node initiates a Route 
Discovery for the target node. If the ROUTE 
REQUESTs for this Discovery forwarded by the 
attacker are the first to reach each neighbor of the 
target, then any route discovered by this Route 
Discovery will include a hop through the attacker. 
That is, when a neighbor of the target receives the 
rushed REQUEST from the attacker, it forwards that 
REQUEST, and will not forward any further 
REQUESTs from this Route Discovery. When non-
attacking REQUESTs arrive later at these nodes, they 
will discard those legitimate REQUESTs. As a result, 
the initiator will be unable to discover any usable 
routes (i.e., routes that do not include the attacker) 
containing at least two hops (three nodes). 
Blackmail: 
The attack incurs due to lack of authenticity and it 
grants provision for any node to corrupt other node’s 
legitimate information. Nodes usually keep 
information of perceived malicious nodes in a blacklist. 
This attack is relevant against routing protocols that 
use mechanisms for the identification of malicious 
nodes and propagate messages that try to blacklist the 
offender. An attacker may fabricate such reporting 
messages and tell other nodes in the network to add 
that node to their blacklists and isolate legitimate 
nodes from the network [36]. 
Snare Attack [38]: 
Lin et al. have proposed the snare attack, which relates 
to military specific applications. In a battlefield, a node 
could be physically compromised (say when the 
corresponding soldier is caught by the enemy). 
Afterwards, the compromised node could be used to 
lure a Very Important Node, (say the commander), 
into communicating with it. Since the adversary can 
easily intercept any transmission in the network 
through the compromised node, the adversary can 
identify the physical location of the VIN by tracing and 
analyzing some routes. After locating the VINs, the 
adversary will be able to launch a Decapitation Strike 
on those VINs as a short cut to win the battle. 
The Invisible Node Attack [39]: 
Andel et al. have defined the invisible node attack and 
proved it to be different from the existing attacks (man 
in the middle, masquerading, and wormhole) and 
established its uniqueness. They have defined it as In 
any protocol that depends on identification for any 
functionality, any node that effectively participates in 
that protocol without revealing its identity is an 
invisible node and the action and protocol impact is 
termed an INA. Discussing the effects of INA on 
different routing protocols, they have shown it to be a 
unsolvable attack so far. 
 
4 SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST ROUTING 
ATTACKS IN MANETS 
In this section, we will discuss the countermeasures 
against the routing attacks and secured routing 
protocols in MANETS. 
Solutions to the Flooding Attack: 
In [40], Yi et al. have proposed a simple mechanism to 
prevent the flooding attack in the AODV protocol. 
Here each node is to monitor its neighbors’ RREQ. If 
the RREQ rate of any neighbor exceeds the predefined 
threshold, the node records the ID of this neighbor in a 
blacklist. All future RREQs from the blacklisted nodes 
are then dropped. But this approach has limitations 
that a flooding threshold has to be set below which the 
attack cannot be detected. Also if a genuine nodes ID is 
impersonated by a malicious node and a large number 
of RREQs, are broadcast, other nodes might put the ID 
of this legitimate node on the blacklist. 
 In [41], Desilva et al. have proposed an 
adaptive technique to mitigate the effect of a flooding 
attack in the AODV protocol. It uses a statistical 
analysis to detect malicious RREQ floods and avoid the 
forwarding of such packets. The approach to attack 
detection is similar to that in [40.] with the difference 
that instead of a fixed threshold, this approach 
determines the threshold based on a statistical analysis 
of RREQs. The key advantage of this approach is that it 
can reduce the impact of the attack for varying 
flooding rates. 
 In [42], Guo et al. have proposed a flow based 
detection mechanism against the flooding attacks in 
MANETs using the non-parameter CUSUM algorithm 
[43]. For the attacks when the source and destination 
node addresses are generated randomly for flooding 
(address spoofing), the authors have defined a 
detection feature as the percentage of new RREQ flows 
from the total RREQ flows, over a small time interval. 
This percentage over a period of time should remain 
stably, at a low level for normal network situation. For 
nonaddress spoofing attacks, where the flooding 
RREQ have same source and destination node 
addresses, the detection feature is defined as the 
percentage of RREQ with a fixed set of source and 
destination node addresses to the total RREQ flows 
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over a small time interval. This percentage over a 
period of time should remain stably, at a low level for 
normal network situation. These percentage variables 
being random, CUSUM algorithm has been used to 
detect the threshold level for attack condition. The 
authors have used the DSR protocol for the case study. 
 In [44] V.Balakrishnan et al. have proposed an 
obligation based model Fellowship to mitigate the 
flooding and packet drop attacks in MANETs. They 
have defined Rate Limitation, Enforcement and 
Restoration as the model parameters of Fellowship. 
Trust or security protocols can be used over 
Fellowship to further enhance the efficiency and 
improve the security in MANETs. 
Solutions to the Blackhole Attack: 
In [45] Tamilsevan et al. have proposed that the 
requesting node without sending the DATA packets to 
the reply node at once waits for other replies with next 
hop details from the other neighboring nodes. After 
receiving the first request a timer is set in the 
‘TimerExpiredTable’, for collecting the further requests 
from different nodes. The ‘sequence number’, and the 
time at which the packet arrives is stored in a ‘Collect 
Route Reply Table’ (CRRT). Now the ‘timeout’ value 
based on arriving time of the first route request are 
calculated. Now CRRT is checked for any repeated 
next hop node which if found, it is assumed the paths 
are correct or the chance of malicious paths is limited. 
If there is no repetition then any random route from 
CRRT is selected. 
 In [46] Lee et al. have proposed the route 
confirmation request (CREQ) and route confirmation 
reply (CREP) to avoid the blackhole attack. The 
intermediate nodein addition to sending RREPs to the 
source node also sends CREQs to its next-hop node 
towards the destination node. The next-hop node on 
receipt of a CREQ looks up its cache for a route to the 
destination. If a route is found, it sends the CREP to 
the source. On receipt of the CREP, the source node 
compares the path in RREP and the one in CREP. If 
both are identical the source node pronounces the 
route to be correct. However in this proposal a  
blackhole attack is not resolved if  two consecutive 
nodes work in collusion, that is, when the next-hop 
node is a colluding attacker. 
 In [47], Shurman et al. have proposed the 
source node to wait until the arrival of a RREP packet 
from more than two nodes. On receiving multiple 
RREPs, the source node checks about a shared hop. If 
at least one hop is shared, the source node judges that 
the route is safe. The drawback here is the introduction 
of a time delay due to the wait till the arrival of 
multiple RREPs. 
 In [48], Kurosowa et al. have analyzed the 
blackhole attack and propounded that the destination 
sequence number must sufficiently be increased by the 
attacker node in order to convince the source node that 
the route provided is optimum. Based on differences 
between the destination sequence numbers of the 
received RREPs, the authors propose a statistical based 
anomaly detection approach to detect the blackhole 
attack. This approach has a merit that the attack can be 
detected at a low cost without introducing extra 
routing traffic without modification of the existing 
protocol, albeit false positives is a demerit. 
Solution to Node Isolation Attack: 
In [37] Kannhavong et al have shown that a malicious 
node can isolate a specific node and prevent it from 
receiving data packets from other nodes by 
withholding a TC message in OLSR protocol. A 
detection technique based on observation of both a TC 
message and a HELLO message generated by the MPR 
nodes is proposed. If a node does not hear a TC 
message from its MPR node regularly but hears only a 
HELLO message, a node judges that the MPR node is 
suspicious and can avoid the attack by selecting one or 
more extra MPR nodes. 
 In [49], Dillon et al. have proposed an IDS that 
detects TC link and message withholding in the OLSR 
protocol. Each node is set to observe whether a MPR 
node generates a TC message regularly or not. If a 
MPR node generates a TC message regularly, the node 
checks whether or not the TC message actually 
contains itself to detect the attack. The draw back of 
these approaches is  that they cannot detect the attack 
if it that is launched by two colluding next hop nodes, 
where the first attacker pretends to advertise a TC 
message, but the second attacker drops this TC 
message. 
Solutions to the Worm Hole Attack: 
In [50], packet leashes are proposed to detect and 
defend against the wormhole attack. Hu et al. in their 
work have proposed temporal leashes and 
geographical leashes. For temporal leashes each node 
is to compute the packet expiration time (te) based on 
the speed of light c and is to include the expiration 
time (te’) in its packet to prevent the packet from 
traveling further than a specific distance, L. At the 
receiving node, the packet is checked for packet expiry 
by comparing its current time and the te in the packet. 
The authors also proposed TIK, which is used to 
authenticate the expiration time that can otherwise be 
modified by the malicious node. The constraint here is 
that all nodes have to be tightly clock synchronized. 
For the geographical leashes, each node must know its 
own position and may have loosely synchronized 
clocks. In this approach, a sender of a packet includes 
its current position and the sending time. Therefore, a 
receiver can judge neighbor relations by computing 
distance between itself and the sender of the packet. 
The advantage of geographic leashes over temporal 
leashes is that the time synchronization is not critical. 
 In [51] Qian et al. have proposed a Statistical 
Analysis of Multipath (SAM), which is an approach to 
detect the wormhole attack by using multipath 
routing. The attack is detected by calculating the 
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relative frequency of each link that appears in all of the 
obtained routes from one route discovery. The link that 
has the highest relative frequency is identified as the 
wormhole link. 
 In [52] Su et al. have proposed technique 
based on propagation speeds of requests and statistical 
profiling.  For on demand route discovery schemes 
that use flooding, requests should be transmitted at a 
higher priority than all other packets. This implicitly 
increases the time to exchange information among 
malicious nodes. A distributed and adaptive statistical 
profiling technique to filter RREQs (each destination 
node filters RREQs that are targeted to it and have 
excessively large delays) or RREPs (each source node 
monitors the RREPs it receives and filters those that 
have excessively large delays) is suggested. Since 
different RREQs/RREPs take varying number of hops, 
the upper bound on the per hop time of RREQ/RREP 
packets is so calculated that most normal packets are 
retained and most falsified packets are filtered. The 
main advantages of this approach are that no network-
wide synchronized clocks are required, no additional 
control packet overhead is imposed and only simple 
computations by the sources or destinations of 
connections is required. 
 In [53] Gorlatova et al. have proposed an 
approach that uses the anomaly in the MANET traffic 
behavior, particularly the behavioral anomalies in the 
protocol related packets for detection of worm holes. 
The HELLO message interval was set to 0.3 seconds, 
with a simple jitter function - randomly adding 0.03 
seconds of delay overlaid upon it. The traffic is parsed, 
the HELLO messages arriving at a particular node are 
indexed, and the difference between arrival times of 
HELLO messages sent by its neighbors is calculated. 
The HELLO Message Timing Interval HMTI profile so 
obtained is used for detection of attacker nodes, as the 
frequency profile of HMTI is at a set frequency, a 
violation of OLSR protocol specifications. The interval 
between the packets is repeatedly much larger than it 
should be for a genuine node. 
Solutions to the Rushing Attack: 
In [35] Hu et al. have proposed a set of generic 
mechanisms that together defend against the rushing 
attack: Secure neighbor detection, Secure route 
delegation, and Randomized ROUTE REQUEST 
forwarding. Secure neighbor detection allows each 
neighbor to verify that the other is within a given 
maximum transmission range. Once a node A 
determines that node B is a neighbor it signs a Route 
Delegation message, allowing node B to forward the 
ROUTE REQUEST. When node B determines that node 
A is within the allowable range, it signs an Accept 
Delegation message. The Randomized selection of 
ROUTE REQUEST message to be forwarded, which 
replaces traditional duplicate suppression in on-
demand route discovery, ensures that paths that 
forward REQUESTs with low latency are only slightly 
more likely to be selected than other paths. 
Solution to the Snare Attack: 
In [38] Lin et al. have defined the snare attack, and 
proposed ASRPAKE (An Anonymous Secure Routing 
Protocol with Authenticated Key Exchange for 
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks) and Decoy node 
deployment to mitigate this attack. The proposed 
anonymous secure routing protocol consists of five 
phases: the key pre-distribution phase, the 
neighborhood discovery phase, the route discovery 
phase, the route reverse phase, and the data 
forwarding phase. The anonymity of the VIN can 
further be enhanced using n no. of decoy nodes which 
allow the communication to be routed to the VIN only 
after verifying the authenticity of the source node. The 
main features of this approach are achievable end-to-
end anonymity and security, and the integration of the 
authenticated key exchange operations into the routing 
algorithm. 
Trust Based Security Solutions: 
Another active area of research in Mobile Ad Hoc and 
Sensor Network security in general is the Trust Based 
Security Solutions. In [54] Sun et al. have identified the 
role of Trust in MANETs.  When a network entity 
establishes trust in other network entities, it can 
predict the future behaviors of others and diagnose 
their security properties. Trust helps in Assistance in 
decision making to improve security and robustness, 
Adaptation to risk leading to flexible security 
solutions, Misbehavior detection and Quantitative 
assessment of system-level security properties. 
 Balakrishnan et al. in [44], [55],[56] have done 
extensive work on Trust based security solutions and 
have proposed Fellowship, TEAM (Trust Enhanced 
Security Architecture for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) 
SMRITI (Secure MANET Routing with Trust Intrigue). 
In TEAM a trust model (SMRITI) is overlaid on other 
security models such as key management, secure 
routing and cooperation model (Fellowship) to 
enhance security. SMRITI assists the security models in 
making routing decisions, corresponding to the Trust 
evaluation of the involved nodes. The advantage of 
this approach is that no special/tamper proof 
hardware is required and there is no requirement of a 
central authority as well. 
 
5 SUMMARY 
MANETs is an emerging technological field and hence 
is an active area of research. Because of ease of 
deployment and defined infrastructure less feature 
these networks find applications in a variety of 
scenarios ranging from emergency operations and 
disaster relief to military service and task forces. 
Providing security in such scenarios is critical. 
 The primary limitation of the MANETs is the 
limited resource capability: bandwidth, power back up 
and computational capacity. Absence of infrastructure, 
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vulnerability of channels and nodes, dynamically 
changing topology make the security of MANETs 
particularly difficult. Also no centralized authority is 
present to monitor the networking operations. 
Therefore, existing security schemes for wire networks 
cannot be applied directly to a MANETs, which makes 
them much more vulnerable to security attacks.  
 Of these attacks, the passive attacks do not 
disrupt the operation of a protocol, but is only 
information seeking in nature whereas active attacks 
disrupt the normal operation of the MANET as a 
whole by targeting specific node(s).  
 In this survey, we reviewed the current state 
of the art routing attacks and countermeasures 
MANETs.  The advantages as well as the drawbacks of 
the countermeasures have been outlined. 
 It has been observed that although active 
research is being carried out in this area, the proposed 
solutions are not complete in terms of effective and 
efficient routing security. There are limitations on all 
solutions. They may be of high computational or 
communication overhead (in case of cryptography and 
key management based solutions) which is detrimental 
in case of resource constrained MANETS, or of the 
ability to cope with only single malicious node and 
ineffectiveness in case of multiple colluding attackers. 
Some solutions may require special hardware such as a 
GPS or a modification to the existing protocol. 
Furthermore, most of the proposed solutions can work 
only with one or two specific attacks and are still 
vulnerable to unexpected attacks. 
 A number of challenges like the Invisible 
Node Attack remain in the area of routing security of 
MANETs. Although researchers have designed 
efficient security routing, optimistic approaches like 
Fellowship-TEAM-SMRITI [44, 55, 56], CREQ-CREP 
approach [45] etc., which can provide a better tradeoff 
between security and performance, a lot more is yet to 
be done. Future research efforts should be focused not 
only on improving the effectiveness of the security 
schemes but also on minimizing the cost to make them 
suitable for a MANET environment. 
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